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the	 early	 postmodernity	 witnessed	 their	 protracted	 servitude	 to	 Les	 Grands	 systèmes’s	
jejune	 classifications,	 fallacious	 correspondences,	 and	 meagre	 interpretive	 return	 —	 a	
predicament	 which,	 implausibly,	 endures	 in	 countries	 as	 diverse	 as	 Brazil,	 France,	 and	
Russia	—	 law’s	 comparatists	 began	 taking	 their	 epistemic	 orders	 from	Hamburg	 and	 the	
Hamburgher	 diaspora.	 For	 fifty	 years	 or	 so,	 they	 have	 been	 gorged	 on	 a	 diet	 of	
Rechtsdogmatik,	 scientism,	 objectivity,	 neutrality,	 truth,	 and	 assorted	 shibboleths.	 As	 if	
these	 epistemic	 delusions	 were	 not	 ensnaring	 enough,	 the	 lame	 French	 model	 was	
eventually	 revived	 although	 tweaked	 to	 focus	 on	 traditions	 instead	 of	 systems	 (or	
families).
1
	 While	 critics	 were	 occasionally	 moved	 to	 chastise	 the	 deficit	 of	 threadbare	
Hanseatic	 knowledge-claims	 —	 some	 expressing	 their	 concern	 in	 conspicuous	 venues,	
others	 harnessing	 prestigious	 institutional	 affiliations
2
	 —	 comparative	 law’s	 orthodoxy,	
                                            
*
	SG	 is	 Senior	 Lecturer	 in	 French	 and	 European	 Comparative	 Law	 at	 Kent	 Law	 School,	 Canterbury;	 PL	 teaches	
comparative	law	at	the	Sorbonne,	Paris.	We	work	from	original	texts.	Translations	are	ours.	
1
	 René	David’s	 1950	Traité	 élémentaire	 de	 droit	 civil	 comparé	 was	 rebranded	 as	 Les	Grands	 systèmes	 de	 droit	
contemporains	 in	1964.	The	new	text	has	persisted	through	successive	editions	 in	French	and,	 less	 regularly,	 in	




into	 David’s	 primer	 by	 releasing	 his	 Legal	 Traditions	 of	 the	World.	 In	 one	 of	 the	more	 charitable	 reactions	 to	
Glenn’s	work,	a	commentator	remarked	that	it	was	“as	if	one	ha[d]	been	upgraded	from	an	ordinary	package	tour	
to	 a	 luxury	 cruise	 ship	 with	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 guide	 to	 the	 standard	 sights.”	 William	 Twining,	 Glenn	 on	
Tradition:	An	Overview,	1	JOURNAL	OF	COMPARATIVE	LAW	107,	108	(2006).	
2
	 See,	 e.g.,	 Günter	 Frankenberg,	Critical	 Comparisons:	 Re-thinking	 Comparative	 Law,	 26	 HARVARD	 INTERNATIONAL	
LAW	 JOURNAL	411	 (1985);	George	P.	 Fletcher,	The	Universal	and	 the	Particular	 in	 Legal	Discourse,	 1987	BRIGHAM	
YOUNG	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	335	(1987).	
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somewhat	 extraordinarily,	 has	 hitherto	 been	 able	 to	 operate	 unencumbered	 by	 any	
epistemic	 challenge	 whose	 monographic	 exposition	 would	 have	 proved	 decidedly	 pre-
eminent.	 It	 is	 the	 great	 merit	 of	 Günter	 Frankenberg’s	 Comparative	 Law	 As	 Critique,	 in	
crucial	respects	an	account	at	once	capital	and	extensive,	that	 it	discontinues,	finally,	the	
longstanding	 deployment	 of	 comparative	 law’s	 mainstream	 imposture.
3
	 Frankenberg’s	
refutation	 is	 thus	well	worth	 restating,	 and	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 review	wishes	 loyally	 to	
apply	 itself	 to	this	 important	re-presentative	task	not	 least	by	affording	the	author	much	
latitude	 to	 express	 himself	 in	 his	 own	 voice.	 Yet,	 Frankenberg’s	 considerable	 critical	
integrity	 notwithstanding,	 this	 essay	 holds	 that	 his	 epistemic	 transgression	 remains	 too	
diffident.	 Specifically,	 five	 key	 concerns	 at	 least	 warranted	 more	 subversive	 epistemic	
commitments	 than	Frankenberg	allows.	 In	 the	wake	of	Comparative	Law	As	Critique,	 the	
second	part	of	our	commentary	addresses	these	contentions	with	a	view	to	making	a	case	





Frankenberg’s	 disquisition	 begins	 with	 a	 detailed	 theoretical	 statement	 which,	 by	 the	
author’s	 own	 admission,	 is	 meant	 to	 adopt	 the	 form	 neither	 of	 a	 “treatise”	 nor	 of	 a	
“textbook”	 on	 comparative	 law,	 not	 even	 of	 a	 “comprehensive	 introduction”	 to	 the	
subject-matter.
4









doubt,	 dissent	 or	 discontent.”
7
	While	 the	 book	 does	 not	 expressly	 fashion	 its	 argument	
around	a	ternary	structure,	the	epistemic	claim	it	propounds	—	its	strategy	to	“creat[e]	an	
anarchic	moment	 in	knowledge	production	by	disrupting	the	established	routines	and,	 in	
























comparatists	 should	 stand	 accused	 of	 falling	 prey	 to	 unwarrantable	 ethnocentrism,	 to	 a	
vestrydom	 going	 beyond	 that	 with	 which	 one	 is	 arguably	 inevitably	 burdened,	 it	 bears	
recalling	 Jacques	 Derrida’s	 warning	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 “[o]ne	 [is]	 apparently	 avoiding	





Secondly,	 the	 author	 censures	 law’s	 comparatists	 for	 hiding	 “the	 relations	 between	
knowledge	 and	 power.”
11










	 for	being	“bent	on	determining	what	the	 law	 is	 in	another	country,	the	
law	 as	 contained	 in	 statutes	 and	 court	 decisions	 and	 accompanied	 by	 scholarly	
commentary,”
15
	 therefore	 excluding	 “all	 extralegal	 incursions	 —	 notably	 politics,	 ethics,	
culture	 and	 the	 economy	—	 on	 law-making	 and	 law-deciding.”
16
	 The	 author	 rejects	 this	






is	 almost	 invariably	 complemented	 by	 tales	 of	 its	 scientific	 nature”
19
	—	 as	 is	 indeed	 the	
case	 with	 comparative	 law,	 long	 marked	 by	 the	 “ambition	 to	 promote	 [itself]	 to	 a	
science.”
20

































percipiently	 notes	 that	 “the	 universal	 does	 not	 exist	 independently	 from	 the	 particular	
perspective	 from	 which	 it	 is	 seen.”
23
	 In	 sum,	 the	 author	 reproves	 comparative	 law’s	
“logocentric,	 positivist	 .	.	.	 course,”
24









Thirdly,	 Frankenberg,	 adamantly	 bent	 on	moving	 beyond	 comparative	 law’s	 “unbearable	
formalism,	 barrenness	 and	 mechanistic	 style,”
27
	 attends	 to	 “the	 ethical	 and	 political	
implications	 of	 locating,	 studying	 and	 comparing	 the	 foreign.”
28
	 He	 thus	 propounds	 a	
strategy	“for	recognizing	the	other	—	foreign	 legal	systems,	cultures,	 institutions	—	in	 its	
own	 right,”
29














particular	matrix	 provided	 by	 a	 specific	 cultural	 context	 that	 constitutes	 law	 and	 is	 also	
constituted	 by	 law.”
34
	 According	 to	 Frankenberg,	 “[b]oth	 operations	 encompass	 the	






































with	 a	 historical	 panorama	 of	 the	 discourses	 having	 successively	 dominated	 the	 field’s	
epistemic	 scene	 over	 the	 years.	 Specifically,	 the	 author	 identifies	 four	 principal	 (and	
overlapping)	phases,	which	he	names	 “universalism”
36
	—	 the	1900	Paris	 conference,	 the	











	 effectively	 “an	 analytical	 device	 introduced	 .	.	.	 [for]	 the	 narrow	
purpose	 of	 comparative	 legal	 problem-solving,”
41
	 but	 a	 practice	 “not	 likely	 to	 either	





	 —	 the	 self-indulgent,	 rambling,	 untheorized,	 and	 insignificant	 “common	





meaning	 to	 lawyers	 brought	 up	 in	 various	 legal	 systems.”
45





































	 (Interestingly,	 Frankenberg’s	 diagram,	 perhaps	 heeding	 the	 theological	 quip	
that	one	begins	to	err	as	one	begins	to	count,	 is	silent	on	two	 insistent	configurations	of	
comparative	 legal	 knowledge,	 both	 revealing	 a	 peculiar	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 as	
“flat”	and	both	disclosing	seemingly	unalloyed	faith	in	numbers:	econometric	or	indicator-
based	 research	 adopting	 the	 paradigm	 of	 “standard	 rational	 conduct”	 and	 “empirical”	




relative	 to	 religious	 attire.
48





“tenues”)	 “conspicuously”	 (“ostensiblement”)	 displaying	 religious	 allegiance	 in	 public	
primary	and	secondary	schools.	While	the	author	introduces	the	law	in	force	in	Germany,	
the	 United	 Kingdom,	 or	 the	 United	 States	 and	 also	 refers	 to	 various	 European	 Court	 of	
Human	 Rights	 decisions,	 French	 legislation	 remains	 his	 principal	 focus.	 In	 effect,	
Frankenberg	 contrasts	 “the	 French	 brand	 of	 .	.	.	 militant	 Republican	 secularism”
50
	—	 an	
exercise	 in	 “social-cultural	 hygiene”	 allowing	 no	 room	 for	 any	 “displace[ment]	 [of]	 the	
power	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 culture,	 its	 beauty	 criteria	 and	 loyalty	 claims”
51














































thus	 defends	 a	 robust	 comparative	 practice	 which	 would	 embrace	 “[the]	 [e]thics	 and	
[p]olitics	 of	 [s]kepticism,”
59
	 which	 would	 challenge	 the	 view	 that	 “legislative	 bans	 or	
administrative	measures	 (by	 school	 principals)	 will	 help	 to	 find	 answers	 to	 the	 complex	
problems	 of	 integration	 in	 immigration	 societies.”
60
	 It	 is,	 as	 Frankenberg	 explains,	 about	
“accept[ing]	 the	 otherness	 of	 the	 ‘other’	 without	 othering	 it,”
61
	 that	 is,	 safeguarding	






















	 Id.	 Frankenberg	 repeatedly	 quotes	 Fanon,	 a	 psychiatrist	 and	 philosopher	 having	 settled	 in	 Algeria	 from	 his	
native	Martinique.	 See	 id.	 at	 150–51.	 Fanon	 is	 best	 known	 for	 his	 analysis	 of	 colonialism	 and	 decolonization,	
which	established	him	as	a	leading	anti-colonial	thinker.	On	the	subject	of	veiling,	Fanon	wrote	as	follows:	“This	
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the	 normalization	 of	 human	 rights	 include	 justification	 (or	 vindication	of	 organized	 state	















into	 the	 format	 of	 a	 case.”
72
	 But	 this	 displacement	 entails	 that	 “the	 political-social	
dimension	 of	 a	 conflict,	 the	 personal	 drama	 also	 ten[d]	 to	 get	 lost	 or	 obscured	 in	
translation.”
73






Drawing	on	 contemporary	 ethnography,	 the	 author’s	 bracing	 conclusive	 remarks	 enter	 a	
plea	 for	 “thick”	 comparison,	 for	 narrativized	 comparative	 work	 which	 is	 “open	 to	 local	
knowledge	 and	 context	 sensitive,”
75





























as	 well	 as	 their	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 ramifications.”
77








Eruditely	 invigorating,	 Frankenberg’s	 critical	 aspirations	 are	 nonetheless	 incompletely	
radical,	 his	 oppositional	 edge	 insufficiently	 sharp,	 to	 operate	 as	 comparative	 law’s	
governing	 epistemic	 practice.	 Frankenberg’s	 critical	 reticence	 is	 apparent	 in	 at	 least	 five	
respects.	
	
There	 is	 no	 meaningful	 foreign	 law	 other	 than	 as	 culture.	 Without	 wanting	 to	 reduce	
complex	works	of	scholarship	to	their	abstracts	or	titles,	publishers’	law	lists	and	journals’	
tables	 of	 contents	 obstinately	 offer	 a	 plethora	 of	 evidence	 that	 comparative	 law’s	
orthodoxy	 remains	 in	 thrall	 to	 a	 Kelsenian	 mindset	 whereby	 “[t]he	 law	 counts	 only	 as	
positive	 law.”
79
	 Now,	 ploughing	 their	 grim	 grooves	 positivists	 are	 primarily	 preoccupied	
with	analytics,	that	is,	with	legal	technique	and	with	the	rationalization	of	legal	technique.	
They	foster	“legal	dogmatics,”	to	transpose	the	well-rehearsed	German	phrase,	in	as	much	
as	 they	 purport	 to	 arrange	 the	 law	 in	 orderly,	 coherent,	 and	 systematic	 fashion.	
Throughout,	their	investigations	remain	squarely	set	on	rules	—	on	what	has	been	posited	
by	authorized	officials	as	“what	the	law	is”	—	and	on	the	formulation	of	rehearsals	of	these	




Indeed,	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	 legal	 appears	 so	 uncontroversial	 within	 mainstream	
comparative	law	that	one	finds	oneself	encountering	a	cavalier	dismissal	to	the	effect	that	






a	 contextual	analysis	 so	as	 to	embrace,	 say,	historical,	 social,	political,	 and	 ideological	—	
that	is,	cultural	—	considerations	pertaining	to	the	legislative	text.	But	this	argument	must	
be	 deemed	 unacceptable.	 As	 it	 confines	 culture	 to	 the	 periphery	 of	 the	 legal,	 it	 leaves	
uncontested	the	dominant	view	of	 law-as-law,	of	 law	as	consisting	of	the	 legal	only	—	of	
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statute	 was	 being	 subjected	 to	 a	 spectroscope	 which	 would	 photograph	 the	 ideological	
phantoms	constitutively	haunting	 it.	 If,	 as	 Frankenberg	 convincingly	 suggests,	 the	French	
statute	is	Islamophobic	(that	is,	if	it	inscribes	a	fear	of	Islam),	such	Islamophobia	forms	an	
inherent	part	of	the	statute’s	textual	fabric	and	semantic	reach	so	that	the	legislative	text	
can	 legitimately	 be	 said	 to	 exist	 as	 an	 Islamophobic	 statement.	 In	 the	 process,	 law	 —	
indeed,	 legislated	law,	the	very	hallmark	of	positivism	—	is	seen	to	feature	an	ideological	
mark	or	trace	which	 lives	on	as	 the	statute	and	which	a	close	reading	relying	on	a	sound	
knowledge	 of	 French	 culture	 can	 meaningfully	 disclose.	 This	 affirmation	 is	 well	 worth	
emphasizing.	 Islamophobia	 is	 not	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 contextual	 vis-à-vis	 the	 law	 or	 as	
external	 to	 it	 or	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 parergon	 belonging	 to	 the	 realm	 of	 non-law,	 to	 an	
“outlaw”	space.	Rather,	Islamophobia	informs	the	making	or	fabrication	of	the	law-text,	it	
concerns	 the	 very	 texture	 of	 the	 law-text,	 it	 lurks	 within	 the	 law-text	 into	 which	 it	 has	
morphed	as	 the	 law-text	 that	 now	 exists	—	which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	 remains	 as	 a	 textual	


















The	 vertiginous	 techno-economic	 interdependencies	 and	 space-time	 compressions	
characterizing	 the	 era	 of	 “globalization”	 and	 the	 attendant	 erosion	 of	 specific	 national-
sovereignty	 prerogatives,	 far	 from	 confining	 culture	 to	 irrelevance,	 have	 heightened	 its	
pertinence,	 for	 example	 as	 a	 heuristic	 implement	 allowing	 one	 to	 bear	 (participatory)	
witness	to	the	global	production	of	a	kaleidoscope	of	embodied	and	significant	disjunctive,	
differentiated,	 and	 singularized	 local	 knowledges.	 Indeed,	 a	 comparatist	 investigating	
foreign	law	existing	as	culture	must	acknowledge	that	cultural	inquiry	summons	a	process	
of	quarrying	which	 is,	 in	all	 rigour,	 infinite.	Consider	how	 the	French	 statute	on	 religious	
attire	 at	 school	 also	 instantiates	 a	 centuries-old	 history	 of	 anti-clericalism;	 a	 post-
Revolutionary	 idea	 of	 citizenship;	 a	 vehement	 opposition	 to	 multiculturalism	 (known	 as	
“communautarisme”	in	France)	or	to	minorities’	rights;	a	predilection	for	state	intervention	
and	for	the	enactment	of	apodictic	statutes	purporting	to	install	a	fixed	and	uniform	legal	
meaning	 over	 the	 entire	 national	 territory;	 and	 an	 extolment	 of	 the	 school	 as	 a	 leading	
vector	of	institutionalization	into	republicanism.	In	the	absence	of	a	finite	enumeration	of	
the	 statute’s	 cultural	 markers,	 no	 anamnesis	 can	 attest	 to	 the	 French	 law-text’s	
interminable	 cultural	 embeddedness.	 It	 follows	 that	 there	 are	 never	 exhaustive	
comparisons,	 only	 exhausted	 comparatists	 (ascription	 of	meaning	 to	 law-as-culture	 thus	
falling	prey	to	the	body	and	being	interrupted	by	it).		
	
There	 is	 no	 meaningful	 foreign	 law	 other	 than	 as	 unforeign	 law.	 When	 a	 German	
comparatist	 enters	 a	 Paris	 law	 library	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 French	 statute	 on	 religious	
attire	at	school	so	as	to	articulate	a	(forced)	negotiation	between	French	and	German	laws,	
the	French	 law-text	stands	before	her,	 twice:	 it	 is	 in	 front	of	her,	on	the	statute	book,	as	
she	 sits	 at	 her	 desk,	 and	 it	 has	 come	 into	 legal	 being	 in	 advance	of	 her	 arrival.	 Still,	 the	
statute	 cannot	 mean	 on	 its	 own.	 As	 the	 legislative	 text	 uses	 terms	 like	 “tenues”	
(“attire”/“garb”/“apparel”),	 “manifestent”	 (“attest	 to”/“express”),	 or	 “ostensiblement”	





it	 should	 rest	 on	 thorough	 and	 thoroughly	 interdisciplinary	 research.	 Crucially,	 however,	
the	German	comparatist	we	suppose	dwells	 in	 the	German	culture	or	 language	 to	which	
she	 belongs,	 operates	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 German	 legal	 education	 that	
institutionalized	her	into	the	law,	and	works	pursuant	to	the	influence	of	her	dissertation	
supervisor,	say,	a	leading	comparatist	from	Berlin	who	socialized	her	into	comparative	law	
(himself,	 say,	 the	 pupil	 of	 a	 famed	 Heidelberg	 comparatist).	 (Note	 that	 for	 our	 German	
comparatist’s	heteronomous	engagement	with	the	French	statute	to	be	possible	at	all,	it	is	
necessary	 that	 her	 thought	 should	 be	 immersed	 within	 such	 pre-understanding.	
Otherwise,	how	could	she	even	begin	to	recognize	the	French	statute	as	legislation	rather	
than	 as	 a	 poem?)	 In	 addition,	 the	 reading	 of	 the	 French	 statute	 that	 the	 German	
comparatist	 produces	 foregrounds	 her	 substantive	 and	 stylistic	 emphases,	 choice	 of	
references,	selection	of	quotations,	formulation	of	headings,	adoption	of	certain	words	or	









text	 is	not	 to	be	 found	 in	 it	 like	a	stone	and	hel[d]	up	 for	display,”
85
	but	depends	on	the	
decisive	 enunciative	 intervention	 of	 an	 interpreter	 in	 the	 interpreter’s	 language	without	
which	the	statute	is	destined	to	remain	meaningless.	For	the	meaningfulness	of	the	statute	
to	 emerge,	 interpretation	 —	 in	 effect,	 speculation	 —	 must	 act	 constitutively;	 it	 must	
enable	 or	 emancipate	 the	 text	 into	meaning.	 As	 regards	 the	 French	 statute	 on	 religious	
attire	at	school,	our	German	comparatist	will	thus	move	to	interpret	or	speculate	until	she	
feels	 confident	 that	 she	has	 framed	a	 textual	 interpretation	of	 the	 law-text	amenable	 to	








the	 French	 statute’s	 meaningful	 existence	 is,	 say,	 as	 the	 German	 comparatist’s	 German	
interpretation	in	the	German	language.	This	epistemic	fact	implies	that	when	our	German	
comparatist	writes	on	the	French	statute,	she	is	addressing	foreign	law	in	a	limited	sense	of	
the	 word	 “foreign”	 only.	 Indeed,	 the	 so-called	 “foreign”	 finds	 itself	 always	 already	 de-
Frenchified/Germanized,	 any	Verfremdungseffekt	 instantaneously	 compromised.	 In	 other	
words,	as	the	French	statute	is	performed	by	the	German	comparatist,	it	is	always	already	





as	 transformation,	 inscription	 as	 iteration.	 Paradoxically,	 while	 our	 German	 comparatist	
cannot	 remain	external	 to	 the	French	statute	 that	 she	enunciates	 (her	writing	 tells	“her”	
French	statute),	the	French	statute	that	obviously	exists	without	her	and	irrespective	of	her	
thus	 stays	 out	 of	 her	 reach:	 our	 German	 comparatist	 not	 being	 in	 a	 position	 to	 make	
herself	 external	 to	 any	 re-statement	 of	 the	 French	 statute	means	 that	 she	 is	 effectively	
keeping	the	French	statute	external	to	her.	

















foreign	 law	 cannot	 exist	 meaningfully	 except	 as	 the	 comparatist’s	 constitutive	
interpretation	or	speculation.	No	matter	how	rigorous	one’s	economy	of	application,	 the	
journey	to	cannot	be	achieved,	the	journey	from	cannot	be	escaped.	While	the	comparatist	
may	be	 after	 the	 foreign	 in	 the	utmost	earnestness,	 the	 comparative	 incursion	 stands	 in	





There	 is	 no	 foreign	 law-text	 other	 than	as	 playground.	 (Encultured	 and	unforeign)	 law-
texts	 are	 necessarily	 fashioned	 out	 of	 language	 whose	 intrinsic	 ductility	 generates	 an	
uncircumventable	semantic	lee-way	or	play	—	as	in	“room	for	action,”	“scope	for	activity”	
(Oxford	 English	 Dictionary)	 —	 which	 pertains	 to	 the	 very	 texture	 of	 textuality.	 In	 other	




since	 it	 must	 follow	 that	 “meaning	 depends	 on	 play,”
90
	 no	 original,	 fixed,	 or	 ultimate	
meaning	can	be	extracted	from	a	text.	Rather,	the	making	of	textuality	 is	such	that	every	
text	 structurally	 holds	 the	 possibility	 of	 disseminating	 an	 infinity	 of	meanings.	 This	 is	 an	
irrepressible	 fact	 pertaining	 to	 textual	 architectonics	 which	 every	 interpreter	 must	
confront.	Even	as	the	interpreter	projects	himself	towards	the	text	with	a	view	to	making	





Although	 the	 interpreter	purports	 to	achieve	 the	unconcealment	of	 the	 text,	 the	playing	




	 Instead	 of	 a	 consensus	 between	 interpretandum	 and	
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interpretans,	 there	 is	 insurmountable	 strife.	 And	 it	 is	 because	 of	 such	 discord	 that	
Heidegger	rejects	“the	structure	of	an	agreement	between	knowing	and	the	object	in	the	
sense	 of	 the	 adjustment	 of	 one	 being	 (subject)	 to	 another	 (object).”
92




incompletion	 and	 openness).	 The	 inherence	 of	 play	 to	 textuality	 thus	 denies	 every	
archaeological	 tentative	 to	 seize	 the	 totality	 of	 the	 text’s	 meaning,	 every	 interpretive	
attempt	to	capture	the	entire	text.	No	matter	how	sophisticatedly	the	interpreter	responds	
to	the	play	of	 the	text,	 this	 failure	of	 isomorphism	means	that	textuality	will	preserve	an	
interpretive	 remainder,	 a	 “singularity	 forever	 encrypted,”
94




law-text	 can	 only	 comprise	 a	 set	 of	 noncontradictory	 properties	 —	 either	 the	 French	
statute	on	religious	attire	at	school	is	Islamophobic	or	it	is	not	—	the	structure	of	textuality	
commands	 that	 no	 text	 can	 answer	 to	 one	 and	 only	 one	 admissible	 interpretation,	
awkward	 as	 this	 insight	 may	 prove	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 law’s	 normativity.	 The	
circumstance	 that	 two	 interpretations	 are	 contradictory	 does	 not	 exclude	 that	 they	 can	
both	prove	convincing	at	the	same	time	from	the	vantage-place	of	various	interpreters	or	
of	 different	 interpretive	 constituencies	 for	whom	 the	 play	 of	 the	 text	 generates	 specific	
(and	 incompatible)	 interpretive	 outcomes.	 Although	 incongruent	 interpretations	 —	 one	
that	 imputes	 Islamophobia	 to	 French	 legislation,	 the	 other	 that	 makes	 the	 case	 for	 the	
religious	 disinterestedness	 of	 the	 statute	 —	 cannot	 both	 be	 true,	 the	 notion	 of	 truth	
proves	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 pertinence	 of	 interpretive	 assertions	 since	 the	 play	 of	 the	 text	
entails	 that	 it	 cannot	 mean	 as	 an	 interpretation-independent	 entity.	 While	 the	 French	
statute	 itself	 cannot	 adjudicate	 between	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 interpretive	 or	 speculative	
accounts	 that	are	applicable	 to	 it,	 the	play	of	 the	 text	 ensures	 that	every	 interpretation,	
necessarily	mediated	and	implicitly	denying	other	possible	re-presentations,	intervenes	as	
an	 ever-defeasible	 narrative	 proposal	 which,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 unbiased	 readerly	
criterion,	 is	 destined	 to	 be	 validated	 or	 disconfirmed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 (perceived)	
persuasive	 merit	 or	 demerit	 rather	 than	 because	 of	 any	 intrinsic	 idea	 of	 rightness	 or	
exactness.	Note	that	it	is	not	that	there	is	more	than	one	legislative	text,	and	that	it	is	not	
either	 that	 the	 statute	 was	 drafted	 ambiguously.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 that	 the	 text	 is,	 densely,	
textual.		
	
There	 is	 no	 translation	 of	 foreign	 law	 other	 than	 as	 impossibility.	 Foreign	 law-texts	
typically	 demand	 translation.	 Consider	 our	 German	 comparatist	 in	 a	 Paris	 law	 library	
actively	writing/producing	her	account	of	 the	French	 statute	on	 religious	attire	at	 school	

















the	 undialectizable	 dynamics	 prevailing	 across	 languages.	 Evoking	 Saussure’s	 later	
distinction	between	“signifier”	and	“signified,”	Benjamin	separates	“the	 intended	object”	
(“das	Gemeinte”)	 from	 “the	mode	 of	 intention”	 (“die	 Art	 des	Meinens”).
96
	 The	 intended	
object	 is	 the	material	 entity	 to	which	 a	 word	 refers.	 It	 is	 the	meant.	 Consider	 the	 “San	
Diego	High	 School.”	Now,	 that	material	 entity,	 there,	 is	 the	 self-same	object	—	 the	 self-
same	 meant	 —	 to	 which	 the	 French	 syntagm	 “lycée	 public”	 and	 the	 German	 words	
“öffentliches	Gymnasium”	 both	 refer	 as	 these	 terms	both	 purport	 to	 designate	 the	 “San	
Diego	High	School”	either	in	French	or	German.	Meanwhile,	the	“mode	of	intention”	—	the	
manner	 in	 which	 the	 intended	 object	 shows	 itself	 to	 the	 world	 by	 way	 of	 language	—	
differs	 according	 to	 whether	 the	 manifestation	 takes	 place	 through	 the	 words	 “lycée	










the	 “San	 Diego	 High	 School”	 is	 materially	 what	 it	 is,	 the	 book	 is	 materially	 where	 it	 is.	
However,	the	way	in	which	the	book	occupies	space	differs	across	the	English	and	German	
languages.	 Meaning	 therefore	 does	 not	 exhaust	 itself	 in	 the	 meant	 (the	 “what”,	 the	
“where”).	As	meaning	comes	towards	us	from	out	of	the	words,	it	is	also	bound	to	the	way	
of	meaning	 (the	 “how”)	—	which	 implies	 that	 the	move	 across	 languages	will,	 perforce,	
produce	 “deficiencies”	 or	 “exuberances.”
98
	 If	 there	 is	 the	 co-presence	 of	more	 than	one	
language,	law’s	comparatists	can	safely	auspicate	that	there	will	be	difference	in	meaning	
across	 languages	 for	 there	 must	 be	 (as	 Leibniz	 discerned	 in	 his	 Nouveaux	 essais	 sur	
l’entendement	humain	more	than	three	centuries	ago).	
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Derrida’s	 insight	 that	 there	 can	 never	 be	 translation	 but	 only	 transformation,
99
	 that	
“[w]hat	 [must]	 guid[e]	 [one]	 is	 always	 untranslatability,”
100










discuss,	 in	 German,	 the	 French	 “lycée	 public”	 is	 indeed	 to	 import,	 to	 domesticate,	 to	
indigenize,	 and	 therefore	 to	 angle	 French	 law?	 How	 to	 translate	 the	 untranslatable,	 to	
possibilize	 the	 impossible?	As	 they	 involve	 a	 pattern	 of	 expropriation-and-appropriation,	
these	 questions	 recall	 our	 argument	 about	 foreign	 law’s	 unforeignness	 because	 of	
foreignness’s	inevitable	enmeshment	with	the	interpretive	self’s	epistemic	accoutrements,	


















argument	 for	 the	 valorization	of	 a	 certain	way	of	 knowing.	 The	 idea	 that	method	would	






































Making	 sense	 of	 foreign	 law	 depends	 on	 experience	 and	 experimentation	 (the	 French	
“experience”	 conveys	both	 ideas),	which	 imply	nomadic	 errancy	 and	 “flair.”
110
	Heidegger	
reminds	us	 that	 an	 experience	 is	 not	 banal:	 “To	undergo	 an	experience	with	 something,	
whether	 it	be	a	 thing,	a	human	being,	or	a	god,	means	 that	we	 let	 it	befall	us,	 strike	us,	
come	 down	 on	 us,	 jostle	 us,	 and	 transform	 us.”
111
	 For	 Heidegger,	 a	 way	 (Weg)	 thus	










neither	begins	nor	 leads	 anywhere	 in	particular.	 It	 has	no	origin	or	point	of	 arrival	 since	
thought,	which	must	be	incessant	questioning,	shuns	firm	solutions.	The	insistence	on	the	







to	 release	a	methodology.	And	 I	am	happy	 that	 I	am	thus	 far	not	 feeling	 the	 fetters	of	a	
technique,	 but	 rather	 the	 coercion	 of	 a	 predicament.”
116
	 (The	 comparatist-at-law’s	 own	
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“predicament”	 is	 to	 ascribe	 meaning	 to	 the	 other’s	 law.)	 But	 how	 did	 the	 philosopher	
manage?	Consider	Heidegger’s	own	explanation:	“I	actually	work	factically	out	of	my	‘I	am’	
—	 out	 of	my	 spiritual,	 indeed	 factical	 origin	—	my	 environment	—	my	 life	 connections,	











is	 so	 for	 the	 five	 reasons	 at	 least	 that	 we	 have	 identified:	 in	 order	 for	 foreign	 law	 to	
manifest	 itself	meaningfully,	 it	must	be	seen	 to	exist	as	 culture,	which	means	 that	 it	 can	
never	be	completely	appreciated	through	 interpretation;	a	comparatist	cannot	 formulate	
foreign	 law	 as	 culture	 on	 its	 own	 terms,	 but	 must	 enunciate	 it	 according	 to	 “her”	
enculturation;	 foreign	 law	 cannot	 generate	 a	 fixed	or	 fixable	meaning	which	would	exist	
independently	from	a	comparatist’s	 interpretation;	a	comparatist	cannot	transmit	foreign	
law	 in	 another	 language	 other	 than	 transformatively;	 and	 foreign	 law	 cannot	 have	 its	
integrity	warranted	through	a	comparatist’s	interpretive	obedience	to	a	method.		
	
In	 as	 much	 as	 it	 eschews	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 primordiality	 and	 magnitude	 of	 these	
epistemic	hurdles,	Frankenberg’s	critique	 is	not	as	 resolute	as	ours.	 It	 is	 less	 radical	 than	
ours	(we	use	the	term	etymologically),	and	it	is	also	less	anacoluthic.	Reading	Frankenberg,	
one	may	in	effect	be	led	to	conclude	that	comparative	law	would	ultimately	work	if	only	it	
could	 escape	 the	 stultifying	 epistemic	 shackles	 of	 the	 orthodoxy	 by	 including	 some	
consideration	 of	 law’s	 context,	 by	 showing	 enhanced	 awareness	 of	 the	 comparatist-at-
law’s	 ethnocentric	 bias,	 or	 by	 embracing	 methodological	 pluralism.	 But	 not	 even	
Frankenberg’s	 incisive	 indictment	 of	 mainstream	 cognitive	 assumptions	 addresses	 the	
underlying	fact	that	comparative	law	is	epistemically	doomed	since	the	comparatist	must	
always	 already	 fail	 to	 access	 or	 recount	 foreign	 law	 as	 it	 exists	 in	 advance	 of	 his	
interpretive	assay.		
	
Like	us,	Frankenberg	has	 read	Beckett	 (“Ever	 tried.	Ever	 failed.	No	matter.	Try	again.	Fail	
again.	 Fail	 better.”)
119
	 Unlike	 us,	 he	 refuses	 to	 follow	 the	 playwright	 to	 his	
uncompromisingly	dissensual	conclusion,	to	the	Derridean	view	that	“[t]here	 is	no	world,	
















similar,	 of	 the	 non-resembling	 or	 resemblable,	 of	 the	 non-assimilable,	 of	 the	
untransferable.”
121
	 Let	 us	 be	 clear,	 though,	 that	 to	 assert	 how	 one	 must	 reckon	 with	
comparative	law’s	failure	to	account	for	the	other	 law	or	for	the	other-in-the-law	—	how	
one	 must	 earnestly	 pursue	 the	 “rhetoric	 of	 dissimilation”
122
	 —	 is	 not	 in	 the	 least	 to	
disqualify	comparatism	as	a	necessary	 intellectual	pursuit.	Quite	apart	 from	the	 fact	 that	
the	 very	 existence	 of	 foreign	 law	 interpellates	 one,	makes	 a	 claim	 on	 one,	 solicits	 one’s	
recognition	 and	 respect,	 its	 normative	 relevance	 as	 persuasive	 authority	 compellingly	
prevails	 over	 exclusionary	 national	 or	 territorial	 arguments.	 And	 even	 as	 any	 scrutiny	 of	
foreign	 law	must	 accept	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 epistemic	 gap	 that	 the	 comparatist	 cannot	
bridge	 and	 must	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 comparatist	 and	 the	 foreign	 law	 will	 therefore	
never	meet,	comparative	law	—	la	comparaison	quand	même	—	promotes	the	unravelling	
of	 the	 foreign,	 the	 only	 brand	 of	 interpretation	 that	 can	 prove	 meaningfully	 edifying	
“despite	the	fact	that/because	of	how”	the	comparatist	must	abide	distant	reading.		
	







what	 attentive	 and	 lucid	 understanding	 of	 the	 other	 (and	 of	 the	 self)	 is	 feasible,	 not	 to	
mention	 the	 emergence	 of	 “the	 best	 way	 of	 concerning	 oneself	 with	 the	 other	 and	 of	






















	 D.N.	 RODOWICK,	 PHILOSOPHY’S	 ARTFUL	 CONVERSATION	 306	 (2015)	 (emphasis	 added).	 We	 adopt	 Rodowick’s	
observation	regarding	“his”	discipline	and	apply	it	to	“ours.”	
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